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Abstract
This paper analyses comparative statics for first price auctions and all pay auctions with inde-
pendent private values. In all pay auctions, bidders with low values will respond to a stochastically
higher (in the sense of likelihood ratio dominance) distribution of types by playing less aggres-
sively while high value bidders bid more. In the first price auction, a similar change results in
all types playing more aggressively. Furthermore, we show that a decrease in dispersion of val-
ues, in the sense of a refinement of second order stochastic dominance, although also associated
with an increase in competitiveness, may in addition result in less aggressive play by bidders with
high values in both auction forms. We also find similar considerations in an oligopoly game with
incomplete information: stochastically lower costs can lead to higher prices.
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1 Introduction
Stochastic dominance relationships are essential to comparative statics in games
of incomplete information, such as auctions. However, even a strong ordering
of two random variables - first order stochastic dominance - can be insuﬃ-
cient to ensure unambiguous comparisons in some auctions (see, for example,
Maskin and Riley, 2000a, footnote 14). As a consequence, several strengthen-
ings of first order stochastic dominance have been introduced, including the
monotone likelihood ratio order used for a wide class of examples (Athey, 2002)
and the monotone probability ratio order (also known as conditional stochastic
dominance or the reverse hazard rate order) used in auctions (Lebrun, 1998;
Maskin and Riley, 2000a). These orderings of distributions allow comparative
statics in games of incomplete information involving changes in distributions
of general rather than specific functional form.
In this paper, we focus on the first price and the all pay auctions.1 We
assume independent private values but allow for risk aversion. For these auc-
tions, we extend the comparative statics analysis based on likelihood ratio
orders in two ways. First, we show that the standard first price auction and
the all pay formats have qualitatively diﬀerent comparative statics predictions.
Specifically, there is a diﬀerence in response by low value bidders to a change
in the distribution of types in the sense of a strong refinement of first order
stochastic dominance. In the first price auction, even low types are motivated,
so that a stochastically higher distribution of types leads to more aggressive
bidding by all. On the contrary, in all pay auctions low-value bidders are
discouraged, so that in the more competitive environment they compete less
hard. Further, we show that the same considerations exist in oligopoly in that
a stochastically lower distribution of costs can lead some firms to charge higher
prices.
Second, while being powerful analytical tools, monotone orderings are very
restrictive, ruling out many interesting cases. Being refinements on first order
stochastic dominance, they oﬀer no predictions for changes in the distributions
that satisfy second order but not first order dominance. Informally speaking,
1The established convention is to refer to the winner pays first price auction as the
“first price auction”, and the all pay first price auction as the “all pay auction”. We use
this terminology as it is more familiar to most readers, even though it is not completely
satisfactory as there also exists a second price all pay auction (see Krishna and Morgan
(1997)).
1
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this involves transformations leading to valuations (or signals, etc.) being “less
dispersed” but not necessarily “higher” than before. There has been little work
on the comparative statics arising from a change in distributions in terms of
dispersion. For example, in auctions incomplete information simply means
that there is some uncertainty about the values held by other bidders. What
happens if there is a decrease in the level of uncertainty? With this question
in mind, we employ a refinement of second order stochastic dominance based
on the unimodality of the likelihood ratio, introduced by Ramos, Ollero and
Sordo (2000). Intuitively, one would expect that such decrease in dispersion of
types would lead to uniformly more aggressive play. We show that in first price
auctions, a reduction in dispersion in the sense of this ordering prompts most
types to bid more aggressively, but the highest types may bid less, resulting in
a possible “cross” of bidding functions. Along similar lines, in all pay auctions
there can be a “double-cross” of bidding functions with both low and high
types bidding less.
For all pay auction, the reduction in bids caused by an increase in com-
petition can be explained in the following way. Think of a runner about to
compete in a race who learns that some of the slower competitors will be re-
placed with faster ones. Clearly, there would be increased competition for first
place amongst fast runners. However, with a faster field of competitors, slower
runners would see an even lower prospect of winning and reduce costly eﬀort
and run slower.2 Analogously, in the all pay auction, those with high values
will bid more in a more competitive environment, while low value bidders will
bid less. In contrast, in a standard first price auction, low value bidders do
not face the same disincentive eﬀect. This is simply because one only pays if
one wins, thus the cost of raising one’s bid is oﬀset by the lower probability of
having to pay it.
Existing work on comparative statics for auctions by Lebrun (1998) and
Maskin and Riley (2000a), and, for a wider class of examples, by Athey (2002)
has concentrated on the conditions under which a stochastically higher distri-
bution of valuations should lead to uniformly more aggressive bidding. Here,
we extend this type of result in two ways. First, we show that such a monotone
shift in types is not in fact suﬃcient for monotone comparative statics in all
pay auctions. Further, there are plausible models of oligopoly where a stochas-
tically lower distribution of costs will lead some firms to charge higher prices.
2See Fershtman and Gneezy (2005) for some experimental evidence that increased com-
petition can lead weak competitors to quit.
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This is not to say, however, that there are no meaningful results. Rather for
all pay auctions, we make precise predictions about which classes of agents
will adopt higher strategies and which lower. To our knowledge, this is the
first work to identify the discouragement eﬀect under which weak competitors
optimally respond to greater competition by competing less hard.
Second, we allow for a diﬀerent type of change in the distribution of types
which potentially has a number of applications. What happens if the dis-
tribution of types becomes less dispersed? For a private value auction, this
would mean that the group of bidders becomes more homogenous. The ob-
vious hypothesis is that bidding will be more competitive. This hypothesis
that more precise information should lead to uniformly more aggressive bid-
ding and higher selling prices has been investigated in the context of common
values by Kagel and Levin (1986) and in subsequent literature for specific func-
tional forms of preferences and distributions of signals. More recently, Goeree
and Oﬀerman (2003) investigated the eﬀects of more precise information on
the competitive bidding in a framework that nests both private and common
value cases. Yet, the major drawback of this literature is that providing agents
with “more precise information” has been frequently analyzed by considering
two uniform distributions with diﬀerent support. While being analytically
convenient, this assumption is restrictive. We show that the unimodal ratio
orderings could serve as an alternative technique allowing to analyze more gen-
eral pairs of distributions. We show that in general a reduction in dispersion
does not lead to uniformly more aggressive bidding, even under quite strong
regularity conditions. That is, there are plausible circumstances in which more
precise information will induce some agents to bid less. Again, we characterise
which agents these will be, even though, unfortunately, there is little one can
say about the average bid (and thus about revenue comparisons).
It is worth remembering that measures of stochastic dominance are not
confined to the economics of information. Since the famous work of Atkinson
(1970) they have also been important in the literature on social welfare and
the comparisons of income distributions (see Lambert (1989) for a survey).
However, the ordering more commonly used in this literature is (generalized)
Lorenz dominance, even though it is equivalent to second order stochastic
dominance (Thistle, 1989), and, thus, both measures can be interpreted in
terms of inequality. More recently, income inequality and games of incomplete
information have been considered together (Hopkins and Kornienko, 2004;
Samuelson, 2004; Hoppe, Moldovanu and Sela, 2005) in the context of strategic
3
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social interaction, where the question has been whether increasing equality
leads to greater social competition. It is hoped that this paper will be of some
interest to researchers in both fields as well as in their intersection.
2 Ordering Distributions in Terms of Disper-
sion
Ordering distributions in terms of stochastic dominance is now a common tool
in the economics of information. However, the concentration up to now has
been on first order stochastic dominance and its refinements. Clearly, those
working on income distributions, since the seminal work by Atkinson (1970),
have had greater interest in second order stochastic dominance (equivalent to
the generalized Lorenz order - see Thistle (1989)), which allows ordering of
distributions in terms of dispersion or inequality. In this section, we outline a
refinement of second order stochastic dominance, which, though introduced in
the context of the analysis of income distributions, we will then go on to use
in comparative statics.
In what follows, we consider two distinct non-negative variables X and Y
with finite means µX and µY respectively, having distribution functions F and
G, respectively, with F and G both having support [z, z¯] with 0 ≤ z < z¯.
Assume that F and G are twice continuously diﬀerentiable and the densities
f and g are strictly positive on the corresponding supports. We employ the
following definition of unimodality.3
Definition 1 A function f(z) is unimodal around zˆ if f(z) is strictly increas-
ing for z < zˆ and f(z) is strictly decreasing for z > zˆ.
The following order of distributions was first introduced by Ramos, Ollero
and Sordo (2000).
3This is a slight strengthening of standard definitions of unimodality - for example, by
Dharmadhikari and Joag-Dev (1988, Chapter 1) and by An (1998). In the first source, a
function f(z) is unimodal if
R z
z f(t)dt is convex on (z, zˆ) and concave on (zˆ, z¯). In the second,
the function f(z) has to satisfy the following: for all δ > 0, the set Dδ = {z ∈ Ω : f(z) ≥ δ}
is a convex set in Ω.
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Definition 2 Two distributions F , G satisfy the Unimodal Likelihood Ratio
(ULR) order and we write F ÂULR G if the likelihood ratio L(z) = f(z)/g(z)
is unimodal and E[X] ≥ E[Y ]. 4
˜
Ramos, Ollero and Sordo (2000) showed that this order implies second
order stochastic dominance (equivalently generalised Lorenz dominance).
Proposition 1 [Ramos, Ollero and Sordo (2000), Theorems 2.1 and 2.2.] If
F ÂULR G and E(X) ≥ E(Y ), then F (z) and G(z) cross exactly once at some
z on (z, z¯) and F second-order stochastically dominates G.
If the two distributions have the same means, then the ULR order implies
that G would be a mean preserving spread of F . In simple terms, if F ÂULR
G then distribution F is either stochastically higher than G or, if it is not
stochastically higher, then it is less dispersed.5 Consider a simple example.
Suppose G(z) is a uniform distribution so that its density g(z) is a constant,
then L(z) will be unimodal if f(z) is unimodal, that is, it is less dispersed
than g(z). This example is illustrated in Figure 1. It is well-known (see, for
example, Dharmadhikari and Joag-Dev (1988)) that all logconcave functions
are unimodal.6 Thus, as Ramos, Ollero and Sordo (2000) showed, if logL(z)
is concave and µX ≥ µY , then F ÂULR G.
From our definition of unimodality, there is a unique value of z which we
denote zˆL which maximizes the likelihood ratio L(z), with zˆL ≤ z¯. If the
mode of the ratio is located at the upper bound, that is, zˆL = z¯, we arrive at
a monotone order as a special case.
Definition 3 The two distributions F , G satisfy the Monotone Likelihood Ra-
tio (MLR) order and we write F ÂMLR G, if the ratio of their densities L(z)
is strictly increasing.
Milgrom (1981) introduced the MLR order to the economics of informa-
tion. More recently, Athey (2002) employs the MLR order to obtain monotone
4Note that the condition on the means rules out the possibility that the mode is at the
lower bound which would imply that Y first order dominates X.
5The ULR order implies second order stochastic dominance. Remember that if a random
variableX second order stochastically dominates random variable Y , any risk averse decision
maker will prefer X as, by second order stochastic dominance, either it oﬀers a higher return
and/or it is less risky.
6For review of logconcave and logconvex functions see An (1998).
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zz z˜
1
z¯zˆ− zˆ+
F (z)
f(z) f(z)
g(z)
F (z)
G(z)
Figure 1: An Example where Distribution F ULR Dominates G
comparative statics in games of incomplete information. As Milgrom (1981)
points out, many well known families of distributions - for example, the nor-
mal and the exponential - satisfy the MLR order. A similar set of families of
distributions satisfy ULR order. One can easily verify that, for example, if F
and G are both normal or both lognormal, with µX ≥ µY and with F having
strictly lower standard deviation then F ÂULR G.
It is well-known that the MLR order implies first order stochastic domi-
nance and other refinements of first order stochastic dominance, such as the
hazard rate order and the reverse hazard rate order, see, for example, Krishna
(2002, Appendix B). Similar relationships can be shown for the ULR order.
Define the probability ratio and the survival ratio as respectively,
P (z) =
F (z)
G(z)
, Q(z) =
1− F (z)
1−G(z) . (1)
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Proposition 2 [Metzger and Rüschendorf (1991, Theorems 2.3 and 2.3 (c))]
If L(z) is unimodal with maximum at zˆL then P (z) is unimodal with a maxi-
mum at zˆP ≥ zˆL and Q(z) is unimodal with a maximum at zˆQ ≤ zˆL.
The ratio σ(z) = f(z)/F (z) is known as the “reverse hazard rate” in the
statistics literature (see, for example, Shaked and Shanthikumar (1994)). Note
that if the probability ratio of two distributions is strictly increasing then the
two reverse hazard ratios are ordered, or
P 0(z) > (<)0⇒ σF (z) =
f(z)
F (z)
> (<)
g(z)
G(z)
= σG(z). (2)
There is a similar relation between Q(z) and the hazard ratio, which for a
distribution function F (z) is defined as λ(z) = f(z)/(1− F (z)). That is, it is
the ratio of the density to the survival function, 1− F (z). Note that
Q0(z) > (<)0⇒ λF (z) =
f(z)
1− F (z) < (>)
g(z)
1−G(z) = λG(z). (3)
Therefore, combined with Proposition 2, these relations lead to the following
corollary, which will prove useful for comparative statics.
Corollary 1 Suppose F ÂULR G then (i) σF (z) > σG(z) almost everywhere
on (z, zˆP ), and σF (z) < σG(z) almost everywhere on (zˆP , z¯); (ii) λF (z) <
λG(z) almost everywhere on (z, zˆQ), and λF (z) > λG(z) almost everywhere on
(zˆQ, z¯).
Corollary 2 Suppose F ÂMLR G then (i) P 0(z) > 0 almost everywhere on
(z, z¯), i.e. σF (z) > σG(z) almost everywhere on the entire interval; (i) Q0(z) >
0 almost everywhere on (z, z¯), i.e. λF (z) < λG(z) almost everywhere on the
entire interval.
3 The First Price Auction
We start with the standard (winner pays) first price auction with independent
private values. We compare auctions that take place under two diﬀerent dis-
tributions of valuations. We show (Proposition 4) that, when the distributions
are ordered according to the ULR order, bids are higher under the less dis-
persed distribution except perhaps at high values. But this result also implies
7
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(Corollary 3) that when the distributions are ordered according to the MLR
order, which is a special case of the ULR order and implies that the domi-
nant distribution is first order stochastically higher, there is uniformly higher
bidding under the dominant distribution.
There are n ≥ 2 bidders each with a private value z independently drawn
from a common distribution F (z), which is twice diﬀerentiable with strictly
positive density on its support [z, z¯]. Each agent makes a bid x which can be
any non-negative real number. Strategies will therefore be of the form x(z), a
mapping from value to action. We go on to consider the eﬀects of changes in
the distribution F (z) on the symmetric equilibrium strategy.
If an agent with value z wins with bid x, she is awarded the object for sale
and gains a payoﬀ U(z − x), otherwise her payoﬀ is zero. Only the winner
makes a payment to the seller. We assume that U(·) is twice continuously
diﬀerentiable with U 0 > 0 and U 00 ≤ 0 and that U(0) = 0. Suppose all
agents adopt the same strictly increasing diﬀerentiable strategy x(z), then the
expected utility V of an agent of type z who bids x(zˆ), that is, as if she had
type zˆ will be
V (x(zˆ), z, z−i) = Fn−1(zˆ)U(z − x(zˆ)) (4)
Diﬀerentiating with respect to zˆ, and setting zˆ to z we have the following first
order conditions
−U 0(z − x)F n−1(z)x0(z) + (n− 1)f(z)F n−2(z)U(z − x) = 0 (5)
Rearranging, we obtain the following diﬀerential equation
x0(z) = (n− 1) f(z)
F (z)
U(z − x)
U 0(z − x) = (n− 1)σ(z)ψ(x, z), (6)
where σ(z) is the reverse hazard rate function and ψ(x, z) = U(z−x)/U 0(z−x).
Solution to this diﬀerential equation together with corresponding boundary
condition will constitute symmetric equilibria for the auction.
Proposition 3 [Maskin and Riley (2000b, 2003)] The unique solution to the
diﬀerential equation (6), with initial conditions x(z) = z represents a symmet-
ric equilibrium for the first price auction that is unique on (z, z¯].
It turns out that the boundary conditions are important for comparative
8
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statics. Here, the lowest-value player bids right the way up to her value.7
As we will see later, the equilibrium behaviour of the lowest type is much
more aggressive in the first price auction than in all pay auction. Moreover,
low value bidders in the first price auction will respond to more competitive
environments by bidding more, while in the all pay they will bid less.
Specifically, we examine the eﬀect of a more competitive distribution of
types in the sense of the ULR order, introduced in the previous section, on
equilibrium strategies. Remember that the ULR order implies that the dom-
inant distribution is either higher or less dispersed than the dominated. We
show that, given a distribution F that is higher in the ULR order than another
distribution G, there will be more aggressive bidding by most types under the
distribution F . Specifically, the bidding function under the higher distribu-
tion xF (z) will cross the other bidding function xG(z) at most once, and if this
crossing does take place, it must do so at a high value.
Proposition 4 Suppose there are two distributions F,G such that we have
F (z) ÂULR G(z). Let xF (z) and xG(z) be the corresponding solutions to the
diﬀerential equation (6). Then, in the first price auction, xF (z) > xG(z)
on (z, zˆP ) where zˆP is the maximum on [z, z¯] of the probability ratio P (z) =
F (z)/G(z). Further, if zˆP < z¯, then xF (z) can cross xG(z) once and from
above on (zˆP , z¯).
Proof: First, by Proposition 2, as F (z) ÂULR G(z) the probability ratio P (z) =
F (z)/G(z) is unimodal and, thus has a unique maximum which we label zˆP .
Now, by Corollary 1, we have σF (z) = f(z)/F (z) > g(z)/G(z) = σG(z)
almost everywhere on (z, zˆP ). Let us first show that if xF (z) and xG(z) do
cross on (z, zˆP ), then xF (z) crosses xG(z) from below. This easy to see from
the equation (6), as it implies that at any point z× such that xF (z×) = xG(z×),
we have that
x0F (z×)
x0G(z×)
=
σF (z×)
σG(z×)
(7)
That is, as σF (z×) > σG(z×) for any z× ∈ (z, zˆP ) we have x0F (z×) > x0G(z×).
This implies that there is at most a single crossing of xF (z) and xG(z) on
(z, zˆP ).
7Actually, a more precise boundary condition for the first price auction is that
limz↓z x(z) = z. Strictly speaking, the bidder of type z is indiﬀerent between all bids
on the interval [0, z] (thus our claim that the equilibrium specified is unique only on (z, z¯]).
The boundary condition x(z) = z is used for reasons of simplicity.
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Consequently, there are three possible cases. First, xF (z) > xG(z) on
(z, zˆP ). Second, xF (z) < xG(z) on (z, zˆP ). Third, xF (z) < xG(z) on (z, z1) for
z1 < zˆP where z1 is the unique crossing point of the two solutions. Note that
the second and third possibilities both imply that xF (z) < xG(z) on (z, z + )
for some  > 0. In this case, as xF (z) < xG(z) and, given our assumptions
on the utility function U , it is easy to establish that ψ is decreasing in x, so
that ψ(xF (z), z) > ψ(xG(z), z) on (z, z + ). Note that also σF (z) > σG(z)
on (z, zˆP ). Together this implies that x0F (z) < x
0
G(z) for all z < z + , which
given xF (z) = xG(z), implies that xF (z) > xG(z) on (z, z + ), which is a
contradiction. Thus, if σF (z) > σG(z) on (z, zˆP ), only the first case is possible,
that is, xF (z) > xG(z) on (z, zˆP ).
Now, F (z) ÂULR G(z) implies that σF (z) < σG(z) on (zˆP , z¯). Examining
equation (7), it is clear that there is at most one crossing of xF (z) and xG(z)
on (zˆP , z¯) and xF (z) must cross xG(z) from above - if at all.
Some intuition behind the failure of monotonicity disclosed in Proposition
4 can be explained in the following way. As the distribution of types becomes
more compressed, the marginal return to raising one’s bid rises as it becomes
easier to surpass rivals whose values are now more closely packed, inducing
more aggressive bidding. Specifically, in the first price auction, the eﬀect of the
distribution of valuations enters through the reverse hazard ratio f(z)/F (z).
Under Corollary 1, we know that f(z)/F (z) > g(z)/G(z) for z < zˆP . That is,
as long as P (z) (as depicted in Figure 2) is rising, then incentives are higher
under the less dispersed distribution F . However, for z > zˆP , the inequality
is reversed. This is possible because in a less dispersed distribution, there are
fewer high values, thus the density f(z) may be quite low for high values of
z (see, for example, Figure 1) and so f(z)/F (z) can be lower than g(z)/G(z).
Thus, the bidding functions may cross for some z above zˆP . We now give an
example of where the bidding functions do not cross, and one where they do.
Example 1 Consider a n-bidder first price private value auction. Let F (z)
be 3z2−2z3 and G(z) = z both on [0, 1] and both having expected values of 1/2.
Then, as G is a uniform distribution and F has a unimodal density (similar
to Figure 1), we have F ÂULR G. If there are two risk-neutral bidders, the
equilibrium bidding functions are xF (z) = z(3z− 4)/(4z− 6) and xG(z) = z/2
for n = 2. These do not cross on (0, 1), but they meet at the boundaries.
However, for three risk neutral bidders, or equivalently if n = 2 but U(·) =p
(·), the solutions are xF (z) = 2z(126 − 175z + 60z2)/(35(3 − 2z)2) and
10
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zP (z) = F (z)G(z)
z
P (z)
z
0
1
z¯zˆL zˆPz˜ z∗
x∗
P (z)
x(z)
xF (z)
xG(z)
Figure 2: Comparative Statics for a First Price Auction
xG(z) = 2z/3. These cross much as in Figure 2. Note that zˆP , the maximum
of P (z) = F (z)/G(z), is equal to 0.75 and the solutions cross at approximately
0.93.
If the maximum of the likelihood ratio is at the upper bound, i.e. zˆL = z¯,
then the ratio is monotone and by Proposition 2 the maximum of the proba-
bility ratio P (z), the point zˆP , will be at the upper bound z¯. Since Proposition
4 establishes that any crossing must take place to the right of zˆP , it follows
that the solutions will not cross. That is, a stochastically higher distribution
of values, in the sense of the MLR order, leads to uniformly higher bidding.
Corollary 3 Suppose xF (z) and xG(z) are the equilibrium bidding functions
for distributions F (z) andG(z), respectively. If F (z) ÂMLR G(z), then xF (z) >
xG(z) almost everywhere.
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This result is well known and is a special case of the results of Lebrun
(1998) and Maskin and Riley (2001a) and Athey (2002). We reproduce it here
solely as a contrast to the corresponding result for all pay auctions, given as
Corollary 4 below.
4 The All Pay Auction
We have just seen that in first price auctions a stochastically higher distri-
bution of values implies a strong competitive response. Specifically, under
the MLR order, in the standard first price auction, bidding is higher almost
everywhere under the stochastically higher distribution. As we will see in this
section, the response to more competitive environments in the all pay auc-
tions is markedly diﬀerent from that in the first price auction. Specifically,
low value bidders will respond to a distribution of values that is stochastically
higher and/or more compressed by bidding less.
Again, we consider an auction with n ≥ 2 bidders, each with a private
value z independently drawn from a common twice diﬀerentiable distribution
F (z), with strictly positive density on its support [z, z¯]. If an agent with value
z wins with bid x, she gains the object for sale and her payoﬀ is U(z − x).
Importantly, we now assume that if she loses her payoﬀ is U(−x). That is,
all bidders must pay their bid, whether they win or lose. Again, we assume
that U(·) is twice continuously diﬀerentiable with U 0 > 0 and U 00 ≤ 0 and that
U(0) = 0. Suppose all agents adopt the same strictly increasing diﬀerentiable
strategy x(z), then the expected utility of an agent of type z who bids x(zˆ),
that is, as if she had type zˆ will be
V (x(zˆ), z, z−i) = F n−1(zˆ)U(z − x(zˆ)) +
¡
1− F n−1(zˆ)
¢
U(−x(zˆ)) (8)
Diﬀerentiating with respect to zˆ, and setting zˆ to z we have the following first
order conditions
−x0(z)(U 0(z−x)Fn−1(z)+U 0(−x)(1−Fn−1(z)))+h(z)(U(z−x)−U(−x)) = 0
(9)
where h(z) = (n−1)f(z)Fn−2(z) is a density of the order statistic Fn−1(z) for
the highest of n − 1 draws. Rearranging, we obtain the following diﬀerential
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equation
x0(z) = h(z)
U(z − x)− U(−x)
U 0(z − x)Fn−1(z) + U 0(−x)(1− F n−1(z))
= h(z)γ(F (z), z, x) (10)
where γ(·) abbreviates the quotient term in the above equation. A solution to
this diﬀerential equation together with corresponding boundary condition will
constitute symmetric equilibria for the auction.
Proposition 5 [Amann and Leninger (1996)] The unique solution to the dif-
ferential equation (10), with initial conditions x(z) = 0 represents a symmetric
equilibrium for the all pay auction that is unique on (z, z¯].
Notice that the boundary condition in the all pay auction is quite diﬀerent
from the one in the first price auction. In particular, the lowest-value bidder
in the all pay auction bids nothing, while in the first price auction she pays
everything. That is, the equilibrium behaviour of the lowest type is much less
aggressive in the all pay auction. Similarly, low value bidders in the all pay
auction will respond to a more competitive environment by bidding even less.
More precisely, we show that the bidding function under the lower distribu-
tion xG(z) is higher for low values but the two distribution functions must
cross over. Finally, just as for the first price auction, under a less dispersed
distribution there can be lower bidding at high values of z.
Proposition 6 Suppose there are two distributions of values F (z) and G(z)
with the same support [z, z¯] such that F (z) ÂULR G(z) and let xF (z) and xG(z)
be the corresponding equilibrium bidding functions for the all pay auction given
by (10). First, xF (z) < xG(z) on (z, zˆ−] where zˆ− is the first crossing point of
f(z) and g(z). Second, xF (z) and xG(z) cross at least once on (zˆ−, z˜) where z˜
is the crossing of F (z) and G(z). Third, either xF (z) > xg(z) on [z˜, zˆ+], where
zˆ+ is the second crossing point of f(z) and g(z) or xF (z) > xg(z) on [z˜, z¯] if
there is no such second crossing of f(z) and g(z). Last, however, xF (z) and
xG(z) may cross again on (zˆ+, z¯] if zˆ+ exists.
Proof: First, the ULR order implies that F (z) < G(z) on (z, z˜). Then, from
the unimodality of the ratio f(z)/g(z) it must be that f(z) < g(z) on some
interval (z, zˆ−) with necessarily zˆ− < z˜ (see, for example, Figure 1). Then, if
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F (z) does not (first order) stochastically dominate G(z) there will be a second
crossing of f(z) and g(z), denoted zˆ+ on the interval (z˜, z¯) (again see Figure
1). This implies that hF (z) < hG(z) on (z, zˆ−) (where both f(z) < g(z)
and F (z) < G(z)), while hF (z) > hG(z) on (z˜, zˆ+) (where, instead, both
f(z) > g(z) and F (z) > G(z)).
Then, note from the diﬀerential equation (10) that ∂γ(F, z, x)/∂F > 0 if
U 00 < 0 and is zero if U 00 = 0. So, for any point of crossing in the interval
(z, zˆ−), we have x0F (z) < x
0
G(z). So there can be only one such crossing. So
either xG(z) > xF (z) as claimed or xF (z) > xG(z) on an interval (z, z˘) for
some z˘ > z. But then as ∂γ(F, z, x)/∂x < 0 and ∂γ(F, z, x)/∂F ≥ 0, it would
follow that x0F (z) < x
0
G(z) on (z, ˘
˜
z). Given xF (z) = xG(z) = 0, we have a
contradiction. So it must be that xG(z) > xF (z) on (z, zˆ−).
Second, suppose now that xG(z) > xF (z) on all of (z, z˜), that is, there is
no crossing. In equilibrium, a bidder facing distribution F (z) with value z
expects utility VF (z) = F (z)n−1U(z − x(z)) + (1 − F (z)n−1)U(−x(z)). Now,
by the envelope theorem, we have V 0F (z) = U
0(z − x(z))Fn−1(z). Thus since
F (z) < G(z) on (z, z˜) and xF (z) < xG(z) we have V 0F (z) < V
0
G(z) so VF (z˜) <
VG(z˜). But as
VF (z˜) = F
n−1(z˜)U(z˜ − xF (z˜)) + (1− Fn−1(z˜))U(−xF (z˜))
we have VF (z˜) ≥ VG(z˜) as F (z˜) = G(z˜) and xF (z˜) ≤ xG(z˜). So, we have a
contradiction and, thus in fact, xF (z) and xG(z) must cross at least once on
(zˆ−, z˜).8
Third, on the interval (z˜, zˆ+), we have both f(z) > g(z) and F (z) > G(z)
and thus hF (z) > hG(z). Thus, at any point of crossing of xF (z) and xG(z)
on the interval, it must be that x0F (z) > x
0
F (z), so in fact, there can be no
crossing. Finally, on the interval [zˆ+, z¯), crossing of xF (z) and xG(z) is possible
where hF (z) < hG(z).
The above result is that low value bidders will bid less under the higher
and/or more compressed distribution F (z), but that the bidding function must
cross over between zˆ− and the point where the two distribution functions cross
z (see Figure 3). The proposition also identifies the possibility of a further
crossing that, if it exists, must take place to the right of zˆ+. Such a crossing is
8Under the stronger assumption of risk neutrality, there will be exactly one crossing of
xF (z) and xG(z) on the interval [z, z˜].
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illustrated in Figure 3. A specific example of these comparative statics is the
following.
Example 2 Consider a n-bidder all pay private value auction. As in Example
1, let F (z) be 3z2 − 2z3 and G(z) = z both on [0, 1]. The density functions
for these distributions cross at zˆ− = 0.211 and zˆ+ = 0.789. If there are
two risk-neutral bidders, the bidding functions are xF (z) = (4 − 3z)z3/2 and
xG(z) = z2/2. These are equal at 0, 1/3 and 1. That is, there is only one
crossing and as per Proposition 6 it is to the right of zˆ−. However, if there
are three risk-neutral bidders then the bidding functions are xF (z) = 2z5(126−
175z + 60z2)/35 and xG(z) = 2z3/3. These are equal at 0, 0.438 and 0.979
so there are two crossings as in Figure 3, with the second to the right of zˆ+
as predicted. That is, both low value and high value bidders bid less under
distribution F (z).
Again the case where F (z) ÂMLR G(z) is a special case of the above result,
where there is no second crossing of f(z) and g(z) and so zˆ+ does not exist.
Then, we have no crossing at high values and high value bidders bid more
under the higher distribution. However, this does not aﬀect the result about
crossing at low values. So, it is the case that even when the distribution
F (z) is very strongly stochastically higher than G(z), the higher distribution
induces lower bids from those with low values. Note the contrast with the
corresponding result for first price auctions, Corollary 3, where all types bid
more.
Corollary 4 Suppose xF (z) and xG(z) are the equilibrium bidding functions
for distributions F (z) andG(z), respectively. If F (z) ÂMLR G(z), then xF (z) <
xG(z) on (z, zˆ−], where zˆ− is now the unique crossing point of f(z) and g(z),
but xF (z) and xG(z) cross so that xF (z¯) > xG(z¯).
The mathematics behind this diﬀerence in behaviour for bidders with low
values in first price and all pay auctions can be seen by comparing the first
order conditions for the two formats. For simplicity, we assume risk neutrality
and the first order condition for the first price auction (5) becomes
−Fn−1(z)x0(z) + h(z)(z − x) = 0 (11)
and the equivalent for the all pay (9) is
−x0(z) + h(z)z = 0. (12)
15
Hopkins and Kornienko: Comparative Statics in Auctions
Brought to you by | University of Edinburgh
Authenticated | 129.215.71.180
Download Date | 2/15/13 4:31 PM
zz
z
0
z¯zˆ+z˜zˆ−
F (z)
x(z)
F (z)
G(z)
xF
xG
Figure 3: Comparative Statics for an All Pay Auction.
In both cases, the first term gives the marginal cost and the second the mar-
ginal benefit of raising one’s bid. The marginal benefit in both cases depends
on the density h(z) = (n−1)f(z)F n−2(z) which gives the marginal probability
of winning. This density is lower for low values under distribution F (z) than
under G(z) (for example, on the interval (z, zˆ−) in Figure 1, it holds that both
f(z) < g(z) and F (z) < G(z)), giving low value bidders in the all pay auction
a clearly lower incentive to compete. Simply put, under the higher distribu-
tion low values are less likely, so that a bidder with a low value is unlikely to
overtake any other bidders by raising her own bid.
However, in the first price auction, the marginal cost of raising one’s bid
(the first term in (11)) is also lower in the stochastically higher distribution as
the marginal cost of a bid here depends on the probability of winning Fn−1(z),
which is lower under F than under G for z < z˜. After all, in the first price
auction, one only pays if one wins. Thus the change would seem to have an
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ambiguous eﬀect. But if one takes the first order conditions (11) and divides
by Fn−1, one obtains −x0(z)+ (n− 1)σ(z)(z−x) = 0. That is, the two eﬀects
can be combined into the reverse hazard ratio σ(z) and we know from the
results of Section 2 that this ratio will be higher on (z, zˆP ) given the ULR
order, or everywhere given the MLR order. Thus, in the first price auction,
low value bidders respond to a higher or less dispersed distribution by bidding
more (Proposition 4).
Finally, similar considerations apply to the type of contests analysed by
Moldavanu and Sela (2001) that are closely related to all pay auctions. The
main diﬀerence is that rather than having diﬀerent values for the object for
sale, competitors who diﬀer in the cost of production compete for prizes that
have a common value. Here we look at the simple case where n agents compete
for a single prize with fixed common value W . The prize is awarded to the
agent with the highest output. Each agent pays a cost cx to produce output
x. Let c = 1 − z, where z is the agent’s type which is an independent draw
from F (z) with support [z, z¯] with z¯ < 1. Thus, an agent choosing x(zˆ) when
all others adopt the strictly increasing strategy x(z) will obtain an expected
utility
V (x(zˆ), z, z−i) = F
n−1(zˆ)U(W − (1− z)x(zˆ))+ (1−F n−1(zˆ))U(−(1− z)x(zˆ)).
A symmetric equilibrium in increasing strategies will therefore be a solution
to the diﬀerential equation
x0(z) = h(z)
U(W − (1− z)x)− U(−(1− z)x)
(1− z) (H(z)U 0(W − (1− z)x) + (1−H(z))U 0(−(1− z)x)) =
= h(z)ξ(F (z), z, x) (13)
where H(z) = Fn−1(z) and ξ(·) abbreviates the quotient component of the
equation. Again we have the all pay boundary condition of x(z) = 0. Notice
that the signs of the partial derivatives of the function ξ(·) in (13) are the same
of the function γ(·) in (10), and thus it is easy to establish a result similar
to that of Proposition 6, where low types will respond to a more competitive
environment by bidding less.
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5 An Example from Price Competition
in Oligopoly
There are similar considerations for procurement auctions and oligopoly games.
That is, there are plausible models of oligopoly where a reduction in costs leads
some sellers to charge higher prices.
Suppose n firms each have constant marginal cost c but the exact level of
that cost is private information. Each is an independent draw from a distri-
bution F (c) with a continuous positive density on [c, c¯]. The firms compete
on price in a simultaneous move game. We assume there is a finite maximum
price p¯ that consumers are willing to pay. The standard model of price com-
petition is of course the Betrand model. As Bertrand competition is formally
similar to a procurement auction (as noted by Spulber (1995)), it easy to show
that, under the MLR order, it would generate monotone comparative statics.
However, we consider another example, as given by Bagwell and Wolinsky
(2002) who consider an incomplete information version of the Varian (1980)
model of price dispersion. There are n ≥ 2 firms that compete on price to
sell to N consumers. Each consumer seeks to buy one unit of the good, if
the price does not exceed a common reservation price p¯. A proportion q of
consumers are uninformed and purchase from a randomly chosen seller. The
other 1−q only buy from the lowest priced firm. In the version of Bagwell and
Wolinsky, each firm has private information about its marginal cost c, which
is an independent draw from the distribution F (c) which has support [c, c¯].
Expected profits for a firm with costs c from charging a price p(cˆ) when the
other sellers use the symmetric strategy p(c) are thus
V (p(cˆ), c, c−i) =
N
n
(p(cˆ)− c)
¡
q + n(1− q)(1− F (cˆ))n−1
¢
.
This gives rise to the diﬀerential equation
p0(c) = (p− c)
µ
(n− 1)f(c)(1− F (c))n−2
A+ (1− F (c))n−1
¶
, p(c¯) = p¯. (14)
where A = qn(1−q) . The boundary condition is that highest-cost player chooses
the highest possible price. In all pay auctions the weakest type bids zero and
never wins, here she names the reservation price and never sells to the informed
customers.
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To explore the eﬀect of general increase in costs on firms’ pricing behavior,
let us define the ratio
Θ(c) =
A+ (1− F (c))n−1
A+ (1−G(c))n−1
ˆ
(15)
We first show that the monotone likelihood ratio order implies the unimodality
of Θ(c).
Lemma 1 If F (c) ÂMLR G(c), then Θ(c) has a unique maximum at some
c ∈ (c, c¯).
Proof: Define RF (c) = (1−F (c))n−1 andRG(c) = (1−G(c))n−1 and use ri(c) =
R0i(c), i = F,G. Note that Θ(c) = Θ(c¯) = 1 and that as F stochastically
dominates G, we have F (c) ≤ G(c) and Θ(c) ≥ 1 for c ∈ (c, c¯). It is easily
checked that at any point where Θ0(c) = 0, then Θ(c) = rF (c)/rG(c). Note
that since
rF (c)
rG(c)
=
f(c)
g(c)
µ
1− F (c)
1−G(c)
¶n−2
= L(c)Q(c)n−2
the ratio rF (c)/rG(c) is strictly increasing on (c, c¯) if both L(c) =
f(c)
g(c) and
Q(c) = 1−F (c)
1−G(c) are increasing on that interval. According to Corollary 2, these
last two conditions are satisfied if F (c) ÂMLR G(c). Finally, since rF (c)/rG(c)
is increasing there can be only one turning point for Θ(c), that is, Θ(c) is
unimodal with a unique maximum at some cˆ.
We now employ the unimodality of Θ(c) to show that in this oligopoly
model, just like in the all pay auction, the MLR order is not suﬃcient for a
uniform increase in prices.
Proposition 7 Suppose pF (c) and pG(c) are the equilibrium pricing functions
arising from the diﬀerential equation (14) for distributions F (c) and G(c),
respectively. If F (c) ÂMLR G(c), then there exist a point c× such that pF (c) >
pG(c) on [c, c×) and pF (c) < pG(c) on (c×, c¯) and c× < cˆ where cˆ is the
maximum of Θ(c).
Proof: Again, define RF (c) = (1 − F (c))n−1 and RG(c) = (1 − G(c))n−1 and
use ri(c) = R0i(c), i = F,G. Furthermore, for i = F,G define θi(c) =
−ri(c)
Ri(c)+A
,
so that p0i(c) = (pi − c)θi(c).
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According to the above Lemma, if F (z) ÂMLR G(z) then Θ(c) is unimodal
with a unique maximum at some cˆ. It is easy to notice that θF (c) < (>)θG(c)
whenever Θ0(c) > (<)0. Thus, if pF (c) and pG(c) cross, then at the point
of crossing c× it must be that p0F (c×) < p
0
G(c×) (i.e. pF cross from above) if
c× < cˆ, and p0F (c×) > p
0
G(c×) (i.e. pF cross from below) if c× > cˆ. Thus, there
could be only one (if any) possible crossing per interval.
Now, since θF (c) > θG(c) on (cˆ, c¯), then clearly p0F (c) > p
0
G(c) on that
interval. This, together with the boundary condition pF (c¯) = pG(c¯), implies
that pF (c) < pG(c) on (c˜, c¯) for some c˜ > cˆ. Furthermore, one can rule out
a possibility of pF (c) > pG(c) on (cˆ, c˜) since that would imply that pF would
cross pG from above, which is a contradiction to the above conditions on the
points of crossing. Thus, pF (c) < pG(c) on (cˆ, c¯).
We will now show that there is a unique crossing of pF (c) and pG(c) on
(c, cˆ). Suppose to the contrary, that there is no crossing of pF (c) and pG(c) on
(c, cˆ). But that would imply that pF (c) ≤ pG(c). Note that in equilibrium, for
i = F,G, a seller of cost c expects Vi(c) = (p − c)(q + n(1 − q)Ri(c)). Thus,
if there is no crossing, we would have VF (c) = (pF (c) − c)(q + n(1 − q)) ≤
(pG(c) − c)(q + n(1 − q)) = VG(c). To show that this cannot happen, note
that, by the envelope theorem, V 0i (c) = −n(1− q)(A+Ri(c)). The MLR order
implies that F (c) < G(c) on (c, c¯), and thus RF (c) > RG(c) on the entire
interval. This, in turn, implies that V 0F (c) < V
0
G(c) on (c, c¯). Thus, given that
VF (c¯) = VG(c¯) = (p¯− c¯)q, it must be that VF (c) > VG(c), a contradiction.
Note that here F (c) ÂMLR G(c) implies that G(c) involves costs being
generally lower. We would expect a decrease in costs to make the market
uniformly more competitive. However, here a stochastically lower distribution
of costs G(c) induces the high cost firms (firms with costs greater than cˆ)
to charge higher prices. Only low cost firms respond with lower prices. The
reason for this is the presence of the uninformed consumers, who ensure that
all firms have a minimum demand of qN/n. With a lower distribution of costs,
a firm at any given level of costs will be less likely to win the competition to
name the lowest price and attract the informed consumers. If one’s costs are
high, the chances of winning can be so low, that it may be better to give
up the chase. Compare this with Bertrand competition (or equivalently this
model with q = 0). There, charging a high price ensures only zero profits.
The relative lack of competitiveness for high cost firms in the Varian model
enables them to respond in a relaxed way to greater competition.
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6 Conclusions
In this paper, we investigate two new types of comparative statics in first price
and all pay auctions, both of which give rise to non-monotone results. First, we
show that in all pay auctions even a stochastically higher distribution of types
does not lead to uniformly more aggressive play. We find similar results for an
oligopoly game with incomplete information: a stochastically lower distribu-
tion of costs will lead to higher prices being charged by some sellers. Second,
we show that refinements of second order stochastic dominance are suitable
for comparative statics, but are not in general suﬃcient for monotonicity.
In this paper, we surveyed some stochastic orderings used to rank distri-
butions in terms of dispersion. We also applied them to comparative statics
analysis. We hope that they will find further similar applications. First, there
has been a recent interest in the eﬀect of changes in inequality in the degree of
social competition (Samuelson (2004); Hopkins and Kornienko (2004); Hoppe,
Moldovanu and Sela (2005)). Second, we do not investigate asymmetric auc-
tions in this paper. However, the orderings in terms of dispersion used here
could also be useful, for example, in determining the eﬀects of one player hav-
ing more precise information than other bidders. This further application of
stochastic orders will be the subject of future research.
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